
One showed up on my calendar this morning. 9:00 AM, labeled "Billing Confirmation — PayPal to place your order — 499.99 USD Support (U.S.): +1 (805) 661-4968." I never opened an email. I never clicked Accept. It just appeared.
I do this work for a living, and this one still made it onto my calendar before I had coffee. That's the point of the attack — it's designed to bypass judgment entirely and bait a phone call before you're awake enough to think twice.
If you run your business on Google Workspace or Microsoft 365, you've seen one of these or you're about to. Here's how it works, why it's dangerous, and how to shut it down for good — on both platforms.

The attacker sends a calendar invite — not an email, a calendar invite — addressed to a list of harvested email addresses. In Google Calendar's default configuration, and in Outlook's default behavior, meeting invitations populate your calendar before you ever open the email. The invite is styled to look like a legitimate billing confirmation from a recognizable brand: PayPal, Norton, Geek Squad, McAfee, or a generic "Identity Protection Service." The "invoice" shows a charge in the $300–$500 range, a professional-looking invoice number, a "Paid" status marker, and — the entire point of the exercise — a toll-free phone number.
The message tells you to call the number if you didn't authorize the charge.
There is no charge. The invoice is fabricated. The logos are lifted. The "Paid" status marker is a graphic, not a transaction.
When you call the number, one of three things happens:
The invite body itself rarely carries executable malware. The phone number is the weapon. One secondary risk worth naming: some of these invites hide malicious URLs in the event's location or description fields. Never click links inside an unsolicited calendar event, and never copy-paste one into a browser.
Three rules:
1. Do not call the number. Ever. Not to verify, not to complain, not to ask them to stop. The number exists for exactly one reason.
2. Do not click Accept, Decline, or Maybe. This is counterintuitive. Instinct says "decline and get it off my calendar." But every response — every response, including Decline — pings the sender's server and confirms your address is live and monitored. That puts you on a prioritized target list for follow-on attacks.
3. Delete the event and report the sender as spam. Delete the event from your calendar without responding, then report the underlying email as spam. That removes the invite without confirming your address.
If you already called the number — stop using that device for sensitive work. Change passwords on any accounts accessed from that machine, from a different device. If you installed anything the caller asked you to install, assume the device is compromised and get it professionally cleaned before trusting it again. No shame in it. These scams are engineered to get past careful people.
Google Calendar, by default, auto-adds invitations from anyone. That's the setting that lets spam invites appear on your calendar before you've seen the email. Change it once and you're done.
On desktop (calendar.google.com):
On the Google Calendar mobile app:
Menu (☰) → Settings → General → Add invitations to my calendar → "When I respond to the invitation in email"
The trade-off: legitimate invites from people you haven't corresponded with before now arrive only as email. You have to click "Yes" in the email to get them on the calendar. For most business users this is a net win. If your work involves receiving invites from strangers regularly — event coordinators, sales reps, recruiters reaching out cold — you'll want to know this is the new behavior.
The change only applies to future invitations. Anything already sitting on your calendar has to be deleted manually.
Microsoft's side of this is messier. Spam calendar invites are a well-documented, ongoing problem on Outlook, and Microsoft has not shipped a general user-facing fix. The settings that do exist are split across Outlook desktop, Outlook on the web, and tenant-level admin controls — and they don't all work the same way.
Here's the practical path for each scenario.
This stops Outlook from automatically processing meeting invitations into tentative calendar entries.
Then:
After this change, meeting invites stay in your inbox as emails until you manually accept them. Trade-off: you lose automatic updates to existing meetings — if an organizer reschedules, you'll have to process the change yourself.
Be aware: this setting primarily controls auto-parsed events from legitimate emails — your airline sending a flight confirmation, for example. It does not fully stop spam meeting invites from appearing on the calendar. That's a separate, deeper issue Microsoft hasn't resolved at the user level.
If you manage a tenant and want to apply this for a user who's getting hammered, the PowerShell is:
Connect-ExchangeOnline -UserPrincipalName youradmin@yourdomain.com
Set-CalendarProcessing -Identity user@yourdomain.com -AutomateProcessing None
This disables automatic processing for that mailbox. Meeting invites stay as emails until the user accepts them manually. Same trade-off as the desktop setting: no auto-updates for existing meetings. Test on one mailbox before rolling it out broadly — AutomateProcessing None changes how Exchange handles every calendar message to that account.
For organizations on Microsoft Defender for Office 365, the stronger controls are:
Schedule.Meeting.Request), with explicit allowlist exceptions for trusted partnersIf you're a DeSoto Consulting client and want this configured for your organization — across users, tenants, and managed devices — reach out and we'll scope it.
This attack works because calendar platforms were designed for a world where nobody sent spam as meeting invites. That world is gone. Any system that auto-accepts input from anonymous senders and places it directly into your workflow will eventually be weaponized. Calendar invites today. Document share links yesterday. Something else tomorrow.
The defensive posture is the same across all of them: reduce what auto-populates, verify what lands, and never trust a phone number that arrived in an unsolicited message. If you need to verify a charge, go to the vendor's real website or call the number on the back of your card. Never the number in the message.
Most firms won't tell you this until it becomes a headline. We'd rather tell you now. Two minutes of settings changes today is worth more than an incident report tomorrow, and honest work means warning people before the trap closes, not after.
Think someone on your team already called one of these numbers? Or want the Outlook and Google settings configured across your whole organization? Reply to this post, or reach me directly.
Sergio DeSoto
DeSoto Consulting LLC
sergio@desoto.io
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